This is a take out pizza bag from the Italian restaurant in Pyongyang North Korea. Who is it that I owe the 10 Euros to for the bag?? (Flickr)

Walter sent me this via E-Mail quite some time ago, and I think it is time to post it. Not only because it is interesting, but because I like this kind of thing. Enjoy!

With a degenerating itinerary our group of seven veterans of the DPRK lobbied the guides to take us to Pyongyang’s Italian Restaurant, opened in April 2009 with much international fanfare.

We were all familiar with the publicity and were curious. Would the food be as good as the propaganda? Because we were being shorted a few stops on our tour they felt an obligation to take us somewhere. I could tell there was some unease on the part of the guides because this was an unplanned stop.

As evening fell the outskirts of Pyongyang became dark – a dark unlike any other city in the world. The streetlights are off and few lights could be seen other than the cars and busses moving commuters. We pulled into what appeared to be a “working class” neighborhood of Pyongyang on Kwangbok Street but it was completely dark. I could make out buildings in the moonlight but with very little detail. The guide said he would go inside and see if it was open. Instinctively I knew it was closed but in the DPRK instinct is useless. The sign flickered on as he told us it was open. We piled off the bus.

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It was very obvious we were not expected. The restaurant was cold and dark – very dark inside. Usually the way this works is they put all the lights on in the restaurant (also in the neighborhood I suspect) to show how lively the place is. We stumbled into the most publicized restaurant in Pyongyang on a regular evening and found it deserted. The video of the opening showed this same restaurant filled.

The group was led into a private room and I spied a small group eating pizza in an adjacent room so indeed the place was open. We were handed a menu and the prices to us were reasonable and the fare attractive. I had eaten pizza in Italy many times over the years and wanted to see if the pizza lived up to the propaganda billing.

We ordered a pizza and enjoyed a small cucumber salad. When the waitress brought the pizza she allowed us all to photograph this work of art. It was most amusing to watch the waitress instruct seven Americans on the proper way to cut and eat pizza. What I found interesting was how authentic the crust and sauce was. This was indeed real Italian Pizza. The guides had not eaten there and we made sure even the driver could taste pizza. The other items on the menu were also authentically Italian but the question of what could be of local manufacture bothered me. When one of our group came back with a photo of the kitchen I soon was heading to the kitchen to shoot some photos. The staff had nothing else to do here so it was fun to look around. They were shy but understanding of the American Imperialist Aggressors taking so many photos. From what I understand everything is imported.

Unintended Consequences of the Visit

We were obviously not scheduled to be in this location judging from the lack of preparation for the visit. Stage management is not the North Korean’s strong suit and I laugh when I hear critics say, “They only show you what they want you to see.” That may be true but we are not blind and how do you stage manage a train wreck?

I see all these foul ups as opportunities to peer behind the curtain. Arriving late or early enables one to see what really happens behind the scenes. Sometimes it is embarrassing for the Koreans and I feel empathy. On the other hand the society is failing miserably. If the successes and accomplishments are because of the Dear Leader, are not the grotesque failures also attributable to his leadership? I don’t think they see it that way.

After pizza (and waiting for several take out pizzas) we were to head back to the bus parked a block away. The darkness afforded us a walk in a neighborhood after working hours and the cover to sneak away from the guides. Several of us went charging out into the night. The Koreans milling about purchasing and shopping could not see that we were foreigners. My first stop was a department store. In the darkness I could see the door was open and on the glass counter was a series of candles. Even the candles were small, similar to birthday candles in the states. The few shoppers seemed to be apathetic about buying and stood around as the clerks had that socialist pallor expression I had seen in so many towns in the Soviet bloc. The goods were not “goods” in any sense but more left over plastic from China. The next store was a shoe store but viewing all black shoes with candlelight was difficult.

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The department store in Pyongyang lit by candlelight.

Moving outside I went over to the kiosks selling fruits and baked goods. One of these actually had a light bulb so we could see what this was. There were goods but no one was buying. I spied a kiosk with a light bulb cooking a dough and cabbage items for a few won that was selling. Unlike the USSR where there was plenty of currency and no goods, this economy had goods but little won chasing the goods. If these were state concerns selling, where were the goods going if this is the surplus? Who gets to eat this way? These pastries looked as good as anything I had seen in China.

We snapped a few photos http://www.flickr.com/photos/zaruka/sets/72157622512053205/ and made our way to the bus as the guides were not pleased at our excursion but made no mention of the episode.

It appears that the DPRK is a cash poor society as some of the commentators have mentioned this year. This was not the only incident of goods being available but few takers. Kiosks outside Pyongyang had food but few people buying. All were state owned and the only free enterprise I saw were some people squatting by the roadside with fruits. In the USSR you found the same activities mostly tolerated by the authorities. Much of it was stolen but there were occasional surpluses or private produce that would surface at a rail stop. In the DPRK this has now stopped except for controlled market places where surplus from family plots can be sold. When I saw people at intersections sitting with apples or other fruits they were still there hours later and it was obvious what was going on.

UPDATE 3: Northeast Asia Matters has posted a copy of the DPRK constitution in English.  Click here to read.

I have been looking for this for quite some time, and now it is available. Reading through it, not huge, groundbreaking changes were made, but enough to (what I guess) a legacy for Kim. Tim will tell the real reason behind the changes. The differences are interesting, but it can also be a function of translation as well.

Oh, and I cannot post the pictures until I get permission. Once I get the permission, I will post some of my favorites. From the E-Mail:

I returned September 25 from the DPRK. I was part of a group of seven Americans taken into the countryside as a pilot by the DPRK to see if they will be taking groups in the future – Haeju, Sariwon, Sinchon, Nampo. We got to see many small villages as you can see. The Kyenam Stock farm was also great. It was run by the local militia.

Emphasis mine. I had no idea they were expanding the trips away from the showcase cities, and having people look at the countryside. From the numbers, it seems small, but I have no idea how often they will do this. Perhaps Walter can shed light on this if he knows.

And yes, it is not too often one gets to the see the countryside. On the other hand, things might change. Why, I have no idea, but I will guess it may be for hard currency. Again, Walter may or may not know the reason.

Photo sets from this trip (2009):

http://www.flickr.com/photos/zaruka/collections/72157622365836747/

Set from 2008:

http://www.flickr.com/photos/zaruka/collections/72157608626515722/

of interest this year:

Rural agriculture and the 2009 harvest – http://www.flickr.com/photos/zaruka/sets/72157622313414387/

150 Day Labor Battle
http://www.flickr.com/photos/zaruka/sets/72157622395904315/

Murals and Propaganda
http://www.flickr.com/photos/zaruka/sets/72157622382860423/

Sinchon Museum of American War Atrocities
http://www.flickr.com/photos/zaruka/sets/72157622514076596/

Anti-American Propaganda book (I have a student translating)
http://www.flickr.com/photos/zaruka/sets/72157622335257009/

For fun: Pyongyang’s Italian Restaurant – I even photographed the kitchen
http://www.flickr.com/photos/zaruka/sets/72157622321475051/

Of interest – China 60th Anniversary Exhibition (for Chinese citizens)
http://www.flickr.com/photos/zaruka/sets/72157622326715475/

I took 3360 photos. I have 1200 from last year.

Oh something good – How about a Worker’s Party of Korea member explaining the Nuclear and Missile issue? Here is a link to the lecture recorded in the Museum of the Revolution adjacent to the exhibit on DPRK missile technology.

There is another video on Youtube from the bottling plant tour also.

The video:

Kim Jong Il meets with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Pyongyang (Times Online/KCNA Special/EPA)

Yes, it has been a while since I have been regularly posting news, and maybe today is a good day to start. Some news has come from North Korea, although nothing really earth-shattering.

North Korea May Be Open to Talks (New York Times) – In a chilling turn of events, Kim is willing to go back to the table and discuss his nuke program if things go nicely in the bilateral talks. The news is so fantastic, we can all break out the Champagne and dance in the end zone now that Kim is finally cooperating with the International community:

SEOUL — The North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, told the visiting prime minister of China that his government was ready to return to six-nation talks on its nuclear weapons program if it sees progress in bilateral talks with the United States, state-run media in North Korea and China said Tuesday.

Oh wait. It is the same song and dance. Kim tosses the bait with promises, gets his goodies and goes right back in his rat hole to do it all over again.

And again.

And again.

Some seem very optimistic, yet in my opinion, is wide-yawn inducing. Kim’s regime needs the aid badly, and this nuke program is his ace in the hole as it always has been from the get-go:

[...] Mr. Kim’s latest comments provided the clearest sign yet that Pyongyang was eager to return to the negotiating table after months of rising tensions over its nuclear and missile tests earlier this year.

But that process, analysts say, is bound to be complicated. North Korea has repeatedly used negotiations over ending its nuclear weapons program as a way of extracting aid and diplomatic concessions from the outside world.

Not news there either. So this much-ballyhooed visit by the Chinese Premier is to make sure he at least has some aid flowing into his coffers as he tries to get Washington to the table. When Washington will go there to have these talks remain unclear, but one thing is for certain; this old game of cat and mouse is far from over, and Kim still has the upper hand in the end (Yes, even with the sanctions).

With the world stage trying to pry the nukes from Kim’s iron grip, some interesting analysis on the economic front from Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard:

* * * *

North Korean Prisons Have Become a System of Extortion, Refugees Say (Washington Post) – This article is a must read, and this only reinforces the long-known nature of North Korea’s growing markets. The same authors have painstakingly researched the famine, which in tuen led to the marketization of the economy, which resulted in the regime reacting to those events, including the ill-fated 2002 reforms.

I went to the East-West homepage and did not see the report, but will post it as soon as it is available.

The report says security forces in North Korea have broad discretion to detain without trial nearly anyone who buys or sells in the local markets, which have become a key source of food for a poor population that suffers from chronic malnutrition. Yet if traders can pay bribes, security officials will often leave them alone, the report says.

“This is a system for shaking people down,” said Marcus Noland, co-author of the report and deputy director of the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics. “It really looks like the work of a gang, a kind of ‘Soprano’ state. But it succeeds in keeping people repressed.”

As one can see, one better have the means to pay off officials to avoid the prison camps. So now, it appears of instead of trying to stop the market activity, it may be more lucrative to squeeze money from the population, on top of the other “traditional” camps:

The survey data analyzed by Haggard and Noland, although imperfect, is the first large-scale attempt by social scientists to paint a picture of how repression in North Korea has changed in recent years to adapt to the collapse of the country’s command-style economy and the rise of a scruffy network of private markets.

At least half the calories consumed by North Koreans now come from food sold in these markets, according to estimates by outside economists with access to North Korean and U.N. food data. And nearly 80 percent of the country’s household income derives from buying and selling in the markets, according to a study last year in the Seoul Journal of Economics.

The fundamental finding of the new report is that North Korea has reinvented its Stalinist-style gulag, which had focused on repression of political opponents. A network of smaller labor camps, Haggard and Noland say, is now aimed at controlling and collecting money from the broader population.

“The classic political gulag still exists, but increasingly labor camps are used to extract bribes,” Noland said. “My impression is that bribery and extortion have become very important to the livelihoods of local government officials.”

And why not? The regime needs to get some money somehow. This in my opinion, smells of desperation by the regime. Just how long and how broad this will go is unclear to me, but as far as I know, this has been going on for some time. Recall some other anecdotes for bribing officials to look the other way when crossing back and forth from China, upon inspections for contraband radios, media, and the rest of it. The bribes from the markets seems to be a natural extension of that.

Wherever it seems to go, the regime appears to stay where it is at while the rest of the population fights to survive. After all, man cannot eat on ideology alone. Since Kim Jong Il has failed to deliver, people have to fend for themselves however they can. In the meantime, Kim Jong Il is all about him. What is in it for him, how can he gain the maximum benefit? This is the core of his mind, and his stone-cold heart of indifference to the population may be his ultimate downfall. Not just in food, but in the way information is getting in and out of North Korea.

* * * *

Path of Succession in North growing clearer by the day (JoongAng Ilbo) – It seems the ROK government received a report that Kim Jong Eun has an important post in KWP as a “deputy director”. Where this report came from or how reliable in the information is unclear, so I will chalk it up as highly speculative. However, the poster spotted in Wonsan may be the clearest indication yet that Kim Jong Eun may be slated to take over the totalitarian regime. The article even goes as far as to date when this may take place:

The report yesterday also claimed that Kim Jong-eun’s formal succession would take place between 2010 and 2012. [...]

Again, I have no idea where those dates came from, and I will not take this for gospel either. Finally, it appears the propaganda is going into some “test markets”, because it appears the propaganda is not all-pervasive yet. Like a frog in boiling water, I am going to guess this cannot happen all at once. If this is successful remains to be seen, and truth be known, once it is official, there will be no escaping the endless propaganda.

Read the PDF here.

I am still trying to save the money and get Lankov’s books. I cannot wait to read them.

Kim Jong Un

Confirmations in North Korea is nearly non-existent, and even if there was a confirmation, it is usually smart to question that as well. Therefore, in the world of rumors regarding Kim Jong Un and his supposed role and/or authority in the Kim regime seem to be front and center? Granted, it is not so much now, but the questions still remain. Therefore, as long as the questions remain, the rumors will keep flying. This article in the DailyNK is no exception. The article is skeptical, as it should be.

As stated many times in this blog, there is no evidence of any succession or a propaganda campaign to build up any new leader as of right now. Does not mean there is not any, I just have not seen it. In North Korea, once something is in the propaganda, it is going to be everywhere, especially if a new leader is getting groomed for power.

It is true in the 1970’s, Kim Jong Il was starting to gain traction in the propaganda and the campaign stopped. I forgot the reason why (I can look it up again), but it started up again. I do not think it is a pattern of any sort, but it seems to me once the leader’s mind is made up, that is that. It is law, and nobody can question it. Yes, some struggle for favor can happen, and there has been some speculation and rumor this happened in the Kim Jr.’s rise in the ranks to become the guy to take the helm. Yes, if it is true Kim Jong Un has favor to become the next leader, and he messes up, dear old dad can change his mind whenever he likes. Something else can come along. I have no idea what position Kim Jong Un has, because there is nothing to indicate what position(s) he holds. Putting the possible problems of succession and power grabs aside, another article caught my eye:

BEIJING — Official documents have confirmed that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s third son, Kim Jong Un, will succeed his father as the nation’s next leader.

According to several internal documents of the North Korean authorities that the Mainichi has obtained, Pyongyang is hastily preparing the way for Kim Jong Un to take over. The documents also state that Kim Jong Un played an important role in what the North described as a satellite launch in April.

The three documents include one titled “Educational Resources on the Greatness of our Revered General Kim Jong Un,” apparently used as a textbook for high-ranking officials at North Korea’s Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces and secret police to learn how to “admire” Kim Jong Un.

Emphasis mine. I would love to get my hands on this document. Again, I have not seen anything to show anybody singing Kim Jong Un praises. If it is, I would imagine it would be in every aspect of North Korean life. Maybe it works like the frog in boiling water. Slowly introduce the new leaders to certain groups? I am not sure. maybe somebody can help me better understand it. On the other hand, if this succession were happening, it is not happening in the same fashion as the transition from kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il. I mean circumstances are different, and Kim Jong Il’s leadership style is really different.

If the Mainichi can produce the documents for the rest of the world to see, I will believe it. I am not saying it is not true, but I am the type to want to see what is out there, so we cann all judge for ourselves. After all, North Korea is not talking yet. The lack of propaganda is a curiosity. When will the big unvieling of the new leader come about? Some speculate 2012. I say it is a wait and see game, because anything can happen, and maybe we will all be surprised and find out is something else completely.

I will look more into this and maybe update it, but if other folks have more info, I would love to hear it.

Oh, and the aid.

The entry is about a year old, and it is in the context of Kim’s health (and it is still questionable), and it goes on to point out:

[...] North Korea is something of an economic black hole in one of the most economically pivotal parts of the world – the intersection of rapidly-growing China, Japan (still the second-largest economy in the world), and South Korea (a major industrial powerhouse). Any serious trouble in the North could lead to its collapse, followed by Chinese or South Korean troop deployments; potential civil war in a country armed with nukes and bio- and chemical weapons; and massive flows of refugees. In other words, there is a major security threat here. In practice, though, I believe that in the event of Kim’s removal, a military-dominated collective leadership would take power and maintain the status quo, at least in the near term.

The economy has already collapsed some time ago, and it does have spurts of recovery here and there, but overall, it is at a standstill. I do agree (if the circumstances are right) a collective leaderhship or some kind of junta can be installed in a possible post Kim era, but this is very hard to speculate at this point. Timing will be everything. Also, the refugee problem if no plan is in place can be a serious problem too. Never mind the debt a post DPRK/post-Kim state would entail. I am just guessing here, and if somebody has some more insight, please let me know.

In the meantime:

So, what are the investment implications of all this? One very obscure security which I have been tracking for some time now is North Korean tradable debt certificates, which were created in 1997 by a group of European bankers to cover the country’s defaulted debt. In 1998, they were trading at 60 cents on the dollar on expectations that North Korea would collapse and be absorbed by the South, which would then honour its compatriots’ debt. However, by 1999, the debt had fallen back to only 7¼ cents on the dollar, according to Exotix Ltd of London. The accompanying chart shows the vicissitudes of the debt price in relation to key events. As you can see, the debt has now fallen significantly from a peak of 32 cents on the dollar in January 2008. This mainly reflects North Korea’s persistent stalling of its ‘denuclearisation’.

Emphasis mine. I do not mean to quote so much of this entry (if this is an issue, please let me know so I can delete or trim it some more), but this is interesting as ever. I do not have any special access to any reports on how these instruments are traded, but i would like to know more. However, these should be some interesting bets with some high level of risk. Anything can change on a dime when it comes to North Korea, and I can imagine any investment can blow up. I mean North Korea does not have a stellar track record of paying bills as the debt certificates suggest (if I am understanding this correctly).

I really wish I had access to the web site, but since I am not a broker or anything of that nature, I guess I may have to look elsewhere for info. If I do find it, or somebody clarifies what all of this means, I will update this post.

I do agree if North Korea wants more loans, it is going to have to lern to play nice, but I do not see that happening anytime soon. In the meantime, Kim uses his slush funds, black market. It seems to be working alright I suppose.

REUTERS/The Korea Sharing Movement/Handout

It appears the Ryugyong Hotel is making some progress, at least on the outside. When construction resumed sometime last year, I almost fell out of my chair. I could not believe such a project would ever resume with the many serious problems this thing obviously has. So I open Google News this morning, and see the picture on the right; the revolving restaurants have a covering now. For months, it had this odd green stuff on it. I still have no idea what that stuff is, and maybe somebody that is in construction can explain to me what that stuff is.

While the thing is getting some glass, metal and other eye candy on the shabby concrete shell, it makes me wonder if this thing can be salvaged. It is true I do not have inside access to the structure (I do think any outsiders do), I cannot say what is being done on the inside. However, it cannot make me sit here and wonder. The structural issues aside, my biggest source of bewilderment is who in the world would want to sink money into this monstrosity. The answer appears to be Orascom.

Foreign residents of Pyongyang contacted in Seoul said Egypt’s Orascom group began renovations last year.

The question is why? The DPRK does not have a terrific track record of paying bills. Perhaps some deal was made, and whatever the details are, I do not think anybody is going to talk. According to the same article:

But few expect the North will ever finish construction of its 105-storey Ryugyong Hotel, started in 1987 and halted for 16 years because it could have bankrupted the destitute state.

I agree there is a lot of reason to seriously doubt the hotel will ever get finished. However, it sat there for 16 years with no progress at all, and then progress started again. Until it does open for tourists and I see pictures of the inside, I am not going to believe it either. At the least, a nice facade can reduce the constant eyesore that has been dominating the Pyongyang skyline for nearly two decades. That alone could be a source of pride. In fact, I think the construction alone should be a massive source of pride and propaganda. If it does get finished, I would not be particularly surprised, because odder things have happened in North Korea. Problem is, it is not going to be officially finished until 2012:

Analysts said the North was likely sprucing up the Ryugyong’s facade as part of a campaign to try to turn the state into a “great and prosperous nation” by 2012.

Ah, so it is not official. Of course, very few things are ever official coming from North Korea. Therefore, it is clear it is a wait and see game. 2012 is a very big date, because that marks the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung, and much speculation swirls around that date (aside from the Mayan predictions of the calendar ending). I will not even begin to guess. I have learned the hard way that is an exercise in folly.

Just like the hotel that reflects the very nature of North Korea itself: Things are rarely as it appears.

Architects said there were questions raised about whether the hotel, which has never opened for guests, was structurally sound and a few believed completing the building could cause it to collapse.

Estimates published in South Korean have put the costs of completing the hotel and making it structurally sound at as much as $2 billion, more than 10 percent of the North’s yearly gross domestic product.

That is a lot of money. Money that can be used for importing food, fuel or paying back the long list of creditors. Oh well, the Leader has better things to do, like glorifying himself some more at the expense of the population.

More status quo. Which is not news either.

Yang Jisheng has kept this journalist's diary of his for 20 years. (source: rthk.org)

In studying the Arduous March, North Korea experienced one of the most deadly famines of the 20th century. According to Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard in the very well-written book, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform. Call me odd (which should be no surprise to anybody), but I became an instant fan of these two economists. The reason is, it is very difficult to find information on the North Korean economy, and while the authors stress the information is not 100% accurate, may contain bias and that sort of thing, the book did tell the story of an event that shakes the lives of millions of people over many generations.

That is a must-read book for any student of North Korea.

Now another book came to my attention when looking to other famines around the world, and in the same book, has a table of famines over the decades. One of the deadliest famines on record is the famine in China during the Great Leap Forward. According to this article:

BEIJING — For such a bold writer, Yang Jisheng comes across as a surprisingly quiet, almost shy, scholarly man. Yet this slightly built 68-year-old retiree has become something of a thorn in the side of the Chinese authorities in recent years.

After a 35-year stint as a journalist for Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, Yang has made a name for himself writing about things the Chinese Communist Party would rather people forgot.

His latest book, “Mu Bei” (“Tombstone”), published this year in Hong Kong, has been hailed as the most comprehensive and authoritative account by a mainland Chinese writer of the Great Famine of late 1958 to 1962, which was precipitated by the calamitous economic policies of Mao’s Great Leap Forward and cost the lives of tens of millions of Chinese.

The title, he writes in the opening passage, has several meanings: “It’s a tombstone for my father who died of starvation in 1959, it’s a tombstone for the 36 million Chinese who starved to death, it’s a tombstone for the system that led to the Great Famine.”

He adds: “There was also a great political risk involved in writing this book. If something happens to me because of this, at least I’m making a sacrifice for the sake of my ideals, so this would also be a tombstone for myself.”

The two-volume, 1,100-page work is banned in China, as is his previous book, “Political Struggles in China’s Age of Reform,” which contains his account of the 1989 military crackdown on student-led pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and three interviews with former Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang. Zhao, who was purged for sympathizing with the students, met with Yang while under house arrest.

From what I understand, the book is not translated into English, the book has been banned in mainland China. Whatever the case may be, I really, really hope this book is translated. I would really like to get my hands on this book. It looks like it has very detailed information. If anybody knows more about this book, please let me know.

Sept. 2 (Bloomberg) — Two U.S. journalists detained in North Korea and released after a visit by former U.S. President Bill Clinton said soldiers from the communist nation “violently dragged” them back across the border from China.

[...]

“We tried with all our might to cling to bushes, ground, anything that would keep us on Chinese soil, but we were no match for the determined soldiers,” Ling and Lee said. “They violently dragged us back across the ice to North Korea.”

[...]

“In the days before our capture, our guide had seemed cautious and responsible,” the reporters said in their statement. “To this day, we still don’t know if we were lured into a trap.

“But it was ultimately our decision to follow him, and we continue to pay for that decision today with dark memories of our captivity.”

I do not know what happened to the guide, and I do not know if the guide will give his side of the story. I had no idea that North Korean guards can run across the border. Now more questions are raised than answered regarding the guide, but until his side of the story is told, we may never know.

Whatever the case may be, it was still not a very good idea to go across the border, but hindsight is always 20/20. It is always a very risky place to hang out, and I always assumed it was because of the Chinese police walking around. I am also going to guess if you try to cross the border, I guess the guards can nab you too. One thing I do not understand; in most documentaries and books I have read, if guards are bribed, they can look the other way. I guess not all work that way, and trying to cross is a very risky business. However, I have never heard of North Korean guards leaving the country to nab somebody. I always assumed guard or not, were not supposed to leave the country.

Maybe they have special permission. I highly doubt it. I also do not know if North Korea has some deal for joint border nabbing duties.

Perhaps somebody can tell me.